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Abstract
Although mad cow disease has reigned supreme as the most feared bovine mal-
ady for the last twenty years, foot and mouth disease (FMD) held that title for 
much of the twentieth century. Since the 1920s, it has been illegal to import 
fresh or frozen meat into the U.S. from countries where FMD exists. Th is san-
itary embargo has been the source of cooperation and hostility in inter-Amer-
ican aff airs. Some scholars consider the ban to be little more than protection-
ism, while others recognize the real biological threat. A cursory glance at the 
1924 FMD outbreak in California reveals the high social and economic costs of 
an epidemic. Th e 1924 incident led to the later embargo which aff ected all Lat-
in American nations. Mexico and the United States entered into a cooperative 
elimination campaign in the 1950s that successfully eradicated the disease south 
of the Rio Grande. Argentina vehemently protested the embargo and tried to 
soften its impact, but did little to eliminate FMD on the ground. It was not un-
til the late 1990s that U.S. importers were able to trade in Argentine fresh and 
frozen meat. Th e case of FMD illustrates how the powerful undercurrents that 
surface in a moment of violence linger long after confl ict subsides. Scholars have 
tended to focus on the political aspects of the FMD ban and neglected the bio-
logical realities of a highly contagious and virulent disease. A similar neglect of 
the biology resulted in a prolonged confl ict between the U.S. and Argentina. In 
a mad cow world, with America now on the wrong side of meat embargoes, the 
cattle industry would do well to consider the value of cooperation and the futil-
ity of protest and denial. 
orn
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 In 1926, the U.S. Department of Agriculture banned the impor-
tation of fresh or frozen meat from any region in the world aff ected 
with foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). While on the surface this em-
bargo did not discriminate between regions, certain countries felt the 
eff ects more strongly. Arguably, Argentina felt the greatest impact, 
in part due to the prominence of the cattle industry in that country’s 
national image. Mexico was also subject to the ban, and the shared 
border with the United States raised the stakes of the embargo. To-
day, the specter of Mad Cow disease has eclipsed FMD in the pop-
ular imagination. In the last few decades, scholars have increasingly 
characterized the U.S. embargo as a politically motivated and unfair 
trade barrier.1 In the pre-mad-cow era, scholars tended to treat the 
threat of FMD more seriously.2 Th e confl icts over the U.S. embargo 
off er compelling evidence for the benefi ts of collective action. 
Th roughout the twentieth century, FMD has remained a serious 
menace to the livestock industry worldwide. Although there have 
been no outbreaks of the disease in the U.S. since 1930, maintaining 
that disease-free environment has been the exception world-wide. 
FMD is highly contagious and can survive in meat and other ani-
mal products for long periods of time at normal pH levels (proper 
cooking eliminates the virus). It infects cloven-hoofed animals, in-
cluding cows, pigs, and sheep, in addition to several species of wild-
life. As the name suggests, the disease causes soreness of the feet and 
mouth, and can result in the death of some animals, while leaving 
other animals sterile, weakened, and commercially worthless. Ear-
ly in the twentieth century, scientists were beginning to realize that 
two strains of FMD existed. Today seven diff erent serotypes are rec-
ognized. In 1999, an outbreak of the most recently discovered se-
rotype in Asia resulted in cases of FMD in Japan (FMD free since 
1908) and South Korea (free since 1934), eventually spreading to the 
Middle East and England in 2001.3 
Th e earliest written record of the disease occurs in 1546 by an Ital-
ian monk. It has survived as a perennial threat to the cattle industry 
ever since. FMD arrived in Argentina during the 1860s or 1870s, car-
ried by unknowing European immigrants. In 1906, the Policía San-
itaria de los Animales (Animal Sanitary Police) were authorized to 
control the exotic disease, which was also known as aftosa in Latin 
America, but apparently made little headway. Th e U.S. suff ered reg-
ular outbreaks of FMD starting in 1870 with reoccurrences in 1880, 
1884, 1902, 1908, 1914, and two in 1924. In total, the federal and 
state governments spent $20 million on eradication and slaughtered 
320,000 cattle at a cost of $150 million during these epidemics.4
Reaction to the 1924 FMD outbreak In California reached hys-
terical proportions, suggesting the depth of American fears. Th e dis-
ease was introduced to Mare Island Navy Yard in San Francisco in 
December of 1923 on ships from Asia. By spring, FMD had spread 
south to the Los Angeles area and cattlemen throughout the West 
were alarmed. Soon, thirty-six states imposed quarantines on a great 
variety of California animals and vegetable products including baby 
chicks, canned goods, manure, and bees. Hawaii embargoed all agri-
cultural products except rice and required all human visitors to the 
islands to disinfect their shoes upon arrival. One state refused an or-
der of railroad ties, another required a shipment of cement be deliv-
ered in disinfected railroad cars, even though the plant was 500 miles 
away from the nearest infection site.5
Arizona’s reaction to the epidemic was the most extreme. Gover-
nor George W.P. Hunt adopted a quarantine so severe that even hu-
man movement across the border was suspended. Five points along 
the California-Arizona border were targeted, but the Yuma Wagon 
and Automobile Bridge was the scene of the greatest disturbance. 
In April, Governor Hunt received a telegram from President Calvin 
Coolidge requesting the relaxation of the quarantine. Hunt respond-
ed that he was unable to comply because FMD was continuing to 
spread in California. He telegraphed in reply that he was obligated 
to “business, banking, agricultural, stockraising and dairy interests… 
[who are] practically unanimous against any modifi cation of [the] 
quarantine and the pressure on me is to make it even more strin-
gent and apply it to passengers on railroad trains passing through 
the state…. Until [the] disease is under control in California, I feel it 
would be courting disaster to this state to modify [the] quarantine.”6 
In order to enforce his edict, Hunt called out the Arizona Na-
tional Guard. Th e crowd of stranded travelers had grown into the 
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hundreds, with one estimate as high as 500 people, including wom-
en and children. Th e standoff  escalated, and soon a Yuma fi re-de-
partment pumper truck was at the bridge to maintain the cordon 
with a high-pressure stream of water. Th e National Guard arrived 
the next day, announcing their presence with short bursts of machine 
gun fi re into the opposing riverbank. Finally, Dr. E.L. Stam, the Ari-
zona veterinarian in charge of sanitation measures, set up decontam-
ination stations. Automobiles were hosed down with formaldehyde 
and railroad passengers were required to walk through sawdust laced 
with formaldehyde. Although initially there was considerable resent-
ment, the process became more orderly and tensions decreased. Th e 
National Guard went home on May 20, although the quarantine re-
mained in eff ect until mid-August.7 
It is easy to dismiss the actions of Gov. Hunt and others as hys-
teria, but the danger was real and the economic costs of FMD were 
high. In California, slaughtering of infected animals provided the 
control of the outbreak. Over 100,000 domestic animals, 22,000 deer, 
and countless smaller animals were slaughtered. Th e total cost was 
over $6 million, with $4.3 million shared between the federal and 
state government for compensation to the owners of slaughtered an-
imals. Th e indirect costs are more diffi  cult to estimate, but one study 
suggests that the epidemic resulted in a nine percent decline in over-
all business activity in the state. Th e agricultural sector was obviously 
aff ected, but shipping and tourism were also negatively impacted.8
During the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, diplo-
matic overtures raised the possibility of relaxed embargo for Argenti-
na. FDR inherited a long history of bad relations with Latin Ameri-
ca in general and Argentina and in particular. In an eff ort to improve 
relations, Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull negotiated 
an agreement with Argentine Ambassador Felipe Espil on the eve 
of Pan-American Commercial Congress held in Buenos Aires. Th e 
agreement adjusted the terms of the 1930 Tariff  Act that mandat-
ed that any embargo be enacted at the country level. Th e new agree-
ment would allow the application of a “rule of reason” whereby re-
strictions would be administered based on regional conditions. Under 
these conditions, an outbreak of FMD in Northern Argentina would 
not eliminate the shipment of meat from Patagonia, for example. Th e 
agreement needed approval by the U.S. Senate to take eff ect.9 
 Th e debate in the Senate furthered the appearance of crass com-
mercialism as an animating force behind the ban. Th e strongest pres-
sure for the ratifi cation of the Hull-Espil agreement came from a 
lobby group headed by foreign traders. Th ey argued that the embar-
go was unfair, and the disease was not as prevalent as some alleged. 
Furthermore, they could see no reason to bar the entry of mutton 
from Patagonia, which was “as detached from Argentina as Alaska 
from the United States.” In the end, the agreement failed to pass the 
Senate. It seems the power of the Western cattle interests exceeded 
that of the foreign trade block.10 Although both sides could be ac-
cused of playing politics, in light of the 1924 FMD epidemic in Cal-
ifornia, it is easy to see how the cattle interests (as well as other in-
dustries) could view any risk of FMD as too great. 
Another Pan-American conference reopened the discussion on 
the FMD embargo. Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Saaverda 
Lamas, on the eve of the Inter-American Conference for the Main-
tenance of Peace, stated his pleasure at FDR’s re-election and his 
“Good Neighbor” policy. Saaverda Lamas hoped that the one re-
maining stumbling block to good relations, the “insistence of the 
United States on shutting out our meat by a sanitary regulation that 
holds that hoof and mouth disease is rampant in Argentina, when 
every one knows it is not.” He invited U.S. experts to investigate con-
ditions, and if such investigations did not occur, he would continue 
to believe the embargo was “unfair because unwarranted.”11 
Although the extent of FMD in Argentina may not have been 
“rampant,” its existence could not be denied. In the spring of 1934, 
an outbreak of FMD started in northern Argentina and Uruguay and 
rapidly spread to Buenos Aires province, the heart of the Argentine 
beef industry. As the 1936 talks appeared no closer to lessening U.S. 
restrictions, Argentine technicians and veterinarians began to call for 
actions within their country to quell the American fears. In October 
of 1937, the Argentine government announced that that movement 
of animals from areas infected with FMD would be strictly regulated. 
However, a decree does not provide a substitute for eff ective policy.12 
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An outbreak in Mexico highlights the challenges and costs of ef-
fective policy and the benefi ts of collective action. In October of 
1946, a shipment of bulls from Brazil introduced FMD near Ve-
racruz. Soon the epidemic spread and in late December the U.S./
Mexican border was closed. By mid January of 1947, over 35,000 
cattle in seventeen Mexican states were known to have the disease. 
On March 1, President Harry Truman signed a bill into law au-
thorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to off er aid to protect vital 
U.S. interests. Seventeen days later, the two countries completed an 
agreement to establish the fi nancial, procedural, and administra-
tive ground rules for the Comisión México-Americana para la Erradi-
catión de la Fiebre Aftosa.13 
Under the commission, the responsibilities were shared equita-
bly. Th e U.S. agreed to pay compensation for the slaughter of cattle 
(ganado mayor), and to provide most of the technicians and equip-
ment. Mexico agreed to pay compensation for the slaughter of sheep, 
goats, and hogs (ganado menor), and to provide the laborers. Both 
sides supplied veterinarians, and the Mexican military was charged 
with enforcement. Although a plan was established, the eradication 
eff ort was no simple aff air. 
After a shaky beginning, the eradication of FMD in Mexico 
was fi nally completed in 1954. Initially, the campaign sputtered be-
cause of lack of funds to compensate ranchers for slaughtered ani-
mals. Th e slaughtering campaign was further slowed because of the 
strain it placed on the Mexican economy. Th is reality forced offi  cials 
to change strategies from a strictly slaughter plan to one that includ-
ed vaccinations. Other issues included the slow Mexican bureaucra-
cy, lack of vaccines, and the scope of the problem. When an outbreak 
of another serotype of FMD occurred in 1949, the Aftosa commis-
sion responded quickly and effi  caciously, proving it was fi nally equal 
to any challenge.14
Th e Mexican example provides several important insights into the 
U.S. FMD ban. First, it confi rms that at the heart of the restriction 
is a concern for the spread of the disease. One can fault the U.S. for 
only extending aid when its interests were directly threatened, but the 
measures taken far exceeded any motivated by trade barriers and com-
modity protectionism. Second, it off ers more evidence that the suc-
cessful eradication of FMD is a lengthy and costly process. By 1950, 
the direct cost shouldered by the U.S. in the cooperative arrangement 
totaled $120 million. If Argentina was going to export it meat to the 
U.S., it would have to do more than off er offi  cial protests.15
Following the success of the Mexican program, the U.S. took ini-
tial steps toward solving the problem of FMD in Argentina. In 1959, 
the “Operation Beef ” program was announced. Th ree experts from 
Iowa State University traveled to Argentina to work with a six-per-
son council of Argentine experts. Th e U.S. contributed a quarter mil-
lion pesos to the joint operation aimed at developing year round pas-
tures, improving calving rates by attacking FMD and undulate fever, 
and cattle feeding techniques. In early 1960, the U.S. agreed to loan 
Argentina over fourteen million dollars to help fi ght FMD.16 
Argentina instituted some vaccination programs, in an eff ort to 
maintain its ties to Europe and in hopes of gaining access to U.S. 
markets for livestock from Tierra del Fuego. In 1960, over eighty 
percent of cattle in Buenos Aires province began to receive vacci-
nations. A few years later, the Servicio de Luchas Sanitarias (SELSA) 
was established to further the eff ort at FMD control. Th e organi-
zation had considerable authority and was largely autonomous. De-
spite extensive vaccination programs and limited slaughter opera-
tions, FMD continued to spread. By 1967, even the bastion of Tierra 
dell Fuego experienced an outbreak of a serotype of FMD.17
Unfortunately, the eff orts at eradication began in the 1960s fal-
tered in succeeding decades. In 1969, Britain banned all Argentine 
beef except boned beef after a disastrous epidemic of FMD in the 
U.K. Th is wrought havoc on the Argentine cattle industry, as Britain 
was its primary customer. Th e Argentine government then placed a 
large land tax that impacted ranchers disproportionately. By 1974, 
the cattle industry was in a crisis. In the face of government price 
ceilings keeping beef prices low, nearly 40 percent of cattle sent to 
market were cows. Th is trend represented a lack of confi dence among 
cattle producers and the decline of overall herd size. Th e combina-
tion of decreased exports and low domestic prices squelched any de-
sire to invest in the industry, including the health of the herds.18 
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In addition to a lack of industry leadership, considerable politi-
cal instability further damped the movement to control FMD. After 
years of Peronist and military rule, the cattle industry continued to 
languish. When the government of Raul Alfonsin resumed constitu-
tional rule in the early 1980s, the economy was in terrible shape. In 
1984, a brief ban on domestic sales of beef attempted to control ram-
pant infl ation and limit speculation on beef prices that had jumped 
thirty percent in the month of February. Under these conditions, lit-
tle attention was given to the eradication of FMD.19
Despite considerable obstacles, at the end of the twentieth centu-
ry Argentina was fi nally able to eradicate FMD. In a joint eff ort with 
Uruguay, in 1995 Argentina experienced a year without an FMD 
case. Two years later, the U.S. Department of Agriculture lifted its 
ban on imports of fresh meat from Argentina. After a brief outbreak 
brought on by cattle smuggled from Paraguay, the importation was 
halted for a time in 2000. Th is time, rather than deny the existence 
of FMD, the Argentine government halted exports on its own when 
the outbreak was discovered.20
Th e embargo on Argentine beef ended with little fanfare. Th e lack 
of recognition is stunning in light of its long and contested history. It 
should be clear that the ban was rooted in concerns about the health 
of American cattle, although along the way Argentine beef was def-
initely used for political purposes by all parties involved. It seems 
that scholars who are quick to dismiss the sanitary aspects of the ban 
are focused on the political aspects (and not the biological issues), 
are sympathetic to the Argentinean perspective, or a combination of 
both. It is equally clear that the U.S. cattle interests preferred to keep 
any competitors out of the domestic market. However, the interests 
of the government and those of agriculture seldom coincide precise-
ly, as suggested by Cordell Hull’s experience. 
Th e specter of cattle diseases continues to haunt the globe. FMD 
remains endemic in Africa, and as the 2001 outbreak in Britain 
shows, it can hardly been considered a bygone threat elsewhere. 
Mad-cow disease is the newest addition to a long line of maladies 
that infect livestock. It has the added danger of seriously menacing 
human health, jumping the species barrier as Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease, which is potentially fatal. Th e history of foot and mouth 
disease suggests that agriculture can be fraught with confl ict and 
that a cooperative, active solution brings better results than cor-
doning off  a state or denying the existence of a problem. More im-
portantly, the rapid spread of FMD provides convincing evidence 
that American security is best served by stable and eff ective gov-
ernments across the globe. 
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